Racial and Religious Hatred Bill

moved Amendment No. 10:"Page 3, line 23, at end insert—" ““(4)   After subsection (5) insert— ““(5A)   In proceedings for an offence under this section it shall be a defence for an accused who is not shown to have intended to stir up religious hatred to prove that the words or behaviour used, or the written material displayed— (a)   were used or displayed in good faith for the purposes of the discussion, teaching or propagation of religious belief or lack of religious belief; or (b)   are justified as being for the public good on the ground that it is in the interests of science, literature, art or learning, or of other objects of general concern.”””” The right reverend Prelate said: I agree with the rest of the Committee in paying tribute to the Minister for her unfailing courtesy, patience and indulgence through this latter stage of the Committee. I thought it important to put on the public record—as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford and myself have tabled a great tranche of amendments, which of course now fall—the particular concerns we have on some of the matters contained in the amendment standing in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Lester, Lord Hunt and Lord Plant, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Carey. The main amendment, Amendment No. 31, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, has the advantage of clarity and consistency in rewriting the Schedule to differentiate between the offences of racial hatred and religious hatred. I agree with him that the ““intention to stir up hatred”” should be a necessary element of inciting religious hatred and support the elimination of the ““likely”” limb which, by its lack of certainty, could leave us hostage to the hyper-sensitive and the trouble-makers. I also agree with him that ““insulting”” words, behaviour, material and so on provide too low a threshold for the offence but that ““threatening”” words, behaviour and so on ought to be outlawed. I have a doubt about ““abusive””, which falls between the other two and sounds as though it ought to be forbidden. However, it may be that the interpretation of what constitutes ““religious abuse”” is too subjective to make it safe to criminalise it and we should perhaps err on the side of freedom. A more substantial doubt arises in relation to—