Racial and Religious Hatred Bill

I have tried to resist the temptation to rise too early because I know that this debate is extremely important and I wanted the benefit of listening to it. I do not stand before the Committee saying that there is no possibility of change whatever. I shall explain the Government’s position. Along with many speakers in the debate, the Government abhor any form of hatred, whether it is founded on race or religious belief, and I think that that view resonates in this place as it does in the other House. It is right that we have been down this way before in relation to these matters, and the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, was absolutely correct to remind us of the evidence that was put before the Select Committee, the importance of this legislation to people in this country and the need to address the issue. But I am disappointed that a number of noble Lords have said that they do not think this legislation should have been brought before the House now, or that the issue can postponed; it really cannot. There are, however, clear differences of view. We all agree on the outcome we want to achieve, but the method by which it is achieved is a matter of concern and dispute. Noble Lords know well, because it was eloquently expressed at Second Reading by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor and replied to by my noble friend Lord Bassam, that the Government’s view is that in order to have parity of treatment between all groups, it would be right and proper to amend this Bill in the way we have proposed, and in the way it has come from the Commons. But we were listening while the Bill made its way through the Commons and we continue to listen now, both at Second Reading and here in Committee. There are issues which we find difficult. The first and by no means the least is that of truncating the offence to restrict it simply to ““threatening””. The reason is that a number of substantive offences can be satisfied already with the mere use of threat. We believe that the words ““insulting and abusive”” add particular importance to this offence. That is because a person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of the offence if he intends thereby—this is an important qualification—to stir up racial or religious hatred. However, I appreciate that of course it is the religious hatred point on which we rightly concentrate. I turn now to the issue also rightly highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, raised by Section 18(5) of the Public Order Act 1986, which refers to a person who is not shown to have intended to stir up racial or religious hatred. He would not be guilty of an offence under the section if he did not intend his words, behaviour or written material to be so, or was not aware that it might be threatening, abusive or insulting. I understand the concern expressed by many noble Lords about the need to show intention. I understand also that the reason noble Lords say that is because they do not want a flippant and inconsequential aside to be used in a pernicious and destructive way to bring about a criminal conviction. That point has been made very clearly. But we have to approach this matter with a degree of calm. My noble friend Lord Parekh was absolutely right to remind us that when the previous legislation went through both Houses, similar concerns were expressed about the chilling effect that such legislation would have on race. I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Lester, said about the difference between race and religion. One is able clearly to identify the one, but the other is by nature more nebulous and less distinct. Race and religion are quite often imparted at birth and can be essential to identity. We have to understand that. Concerns have been expressed about self-censorship. People say, ““Forget about the legal position, will people behave differently?””. Self-censorship was also a matter of concern in relation to racial hatred. The racial incitement offence, which covers nationality, has been in place now for nearly 20 years. It covers the Welsh, the Japanese and those who, like me, were born in Dominica; it covers Australians and the Irish—the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, is right to remind us of that. But it also covers Jews and Sikhs as well as the colour of a person’s skin. I stand before the Committee as a woman of colour, as someone who was born in another country—I am Dominican—and as a woman of resounding and immovable faith. Those three items define who I am. If you utter words of hatred against me in relation to my race, you can be dealt with; if you utter words of hatred against me in relation to the place from whence I hail, you can be dealt with; if you utter words of hatred against me because of my colour, complexion and hue, I can do something about it. But if you generate hate against me because of my faith, I have no means of redress—although I would have a means of redress if I were a Jew or a Sikh. That is the position. There is no evidence—