Racial and Religious Hatred Bill

My Lords, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Desai, I support the legislation. I believe that incitement to religious hatred is destructive of our social order, and like incitement to racial hatred, it should be a crime. Further, I believe that religious hatred exists as a category in its own right and should not be regarded as a surrogate for racial hatred. So, much as I respect the noble Lord, Lord Lester, I am not drawn to his amendment. I also believe that some of the criticisms of the Bill are either unfounded or highly exaggerated. I do not believe that, even as it stands, it will prevent the Christian gospel being preached or religious comedy and satire being expressed, as some claim. It has been argued—most recently by the noble Lord, Lord Sutherland of Houndwood—that race and religion are so different that they cannot be considered in the same way. One is a matter of identity; the other a matter of personal choice. While it is true in theory—that was the aspect that Professor Sutherland in his role as a professional philosopher emphasised—it ignores the fact that religion, especially in our time of rapid social change, is a crucial matter of identity. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Sutherland, in his other hat as a sociologist of religion, would also acknowledge that. As the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, rightly emphasised, religion, like race, is used to categorise whole groups of people. In practice, personal choice usually has little to do with it. So I have no difficulty with race and religion being treated together for this purpose. Both are markers for identity and can be targeted for hate. That said, like many of your Lordships, I have serious worries about the wording of the Bill as it now stands—particularly amendments to Section 3(18)(1)(b) of the Public Order Act, which states:"““Having regard to all the circumstances . . . hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby””." I shall not reiterate those worries at length because they have been mentioned by other noble Lords. But they have to do with the perception of what is being said or written, and that it will be received as abusive or insulting whatever might have been intended, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, hinted in her splendid evocation of Glasgow. There is the important case of Norwood v the Director of Public Prosecutions, as some of your Lordships will know. In that case, the regional organiser of the BNP displayed in the first floor of his flat in Shropshire a poster that contained highly inflammatory anti-Islamic material. Mr Norwood was successfully prosecuted and convicted of a religiously aggravated offence of harassment in breach of Section 5 of the 1986 Act. The district court found that the poster was abusive and insulting to Islam and to followers of that religion, and that it was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress without reasonable justification. The defendant was fined £300 and the conviction was upheld by the divisional court on 3 July 2003. Why was this offence not used in relation to other anti-Islamic material such as that produced by DCI David Tucker to the religious offences committee on 27 June 2002? Why could not already existing legislation be used against such foreseeable offences in the future? We have not yet had any compelling evidence that a new offence, with all the consequent worries to which it has given rise, is really necessary, and why inflammatory material, which clearly exists and needs to be stopped, cannot be prosecuted under existing legislation. I am open to being convinced by the Government that we need a new offence, but we need more evidence than we have so far heard. Because of the great worries that have been expressed, the Government should seriously consider possible amendments to the Bill. A number would be possible. One could be an amendment recognising a defence that there is no offence if the speaker, or whoever is appropriate, is engaged in bona fide religious discussion, education or artistic expression. Another amendment would remove Section 18(1)(b) altogether so that the offence is committed only if the speaker or other person intends to stir up religious hatred. I recognise, of course, that if that occurred there would be a lack of symmetry with incitement to racial hatred, which would remain an offence if the likely effect was to stir up hatred. But we have to recognise that there is a difference between race and religion. As the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, with whom I very much agree, stressed:"““In practice, strong language about belief and unbelief can all too easily be perceived [as abusive or insulting] . . . it might be made a necessary ingredient of the offence for the accused to have an intention to provoke hatred, violence or discriminatory action. The mere likelihood that religious hatred would result would not suffice. This would make it much clearer that the law could not have an inhibiting effect on vigorous debate, polemic and satire about religious belief and affiliation””." There are also other possible amendments. I urge the Government to meet with an all-party group to see whether it might be possible to draw up an acceptable amendment that would meet the very real fears so powerfully expressed in this House tonight.