Racial and Religious Hatred Bill

My Lords, it seems to me that this Bill is aimed at deterring extremes of fear and isolation. It is not about deterring rational discourse or even irrational discourse—provided personal hatred which puts people in fear is not in play. It could have deterred the culture which demonised Salman Rushdie on account of his portrayal of religious belief and made him a target for murder. This Bill is against the personal vilification of apostates. And taking cases is not the only or even the main point of laws to protect people against hatred. The point is to declare a norm, to put it on the statute book—to say, ““we, as a society, defend freedom from personal hatred on grounds of what people believe. If necessary, our defence will go as far as the courts—but essentially the purpose of the law is to define our culture””. The measures the Bill proposes need, of course, to be targeted—perhaps more targeted—and proportionate. We could go farther in circumscribing the powers of the Attorney-General, for instance, including an obligation to take explicit account of Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as the British Humanists Association—and I declare an interest as a vice-president—Justice and the Commission for Racial Equality have suggested. As my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor said, of course the Bill affects freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is not an absolute right. John Stuart Mill, perhaps the greatest proponent of freedom of expression in our culture, said:"““For the interest . . . of truth and justice, it is far more important to restrain the employment of vituperative language””." When freedom of expression becomes intolerable bullying that puts someone in fear it inhibits their freedom of adherence to a belief as well as undermining social peace. In this way the Bill can also safeguard overt freedom of belief. Indeed, it is at least as much about freedom from oppression as freedom of expression. May I take your Lordships to Hopscotch, a charity which provides support and advice to Bangladeshi women in Camden, to help them integrate? I felt so strongly that it was a force for good that I helped to link it to the adult education college I used to chair. Many of the female staff and members of the centre, naturally, wear the identifying hi’jab—and some are now too frightened to leave the house. The director says:"““Many women have had young boys spitting and swearing at them in the street. They are frightened. Their children are frightened””." The members say:"““My aunt was shopping in Queen’s Crescent market when people started shouting at her and pulling her hi’jab””." And,"““It used to be about colour of your skin. Now it is about your faith””." I am depressed by the argument that because we cannot choose our race and can choose our beliefs we can therefore drop our beliefs if we experience personal hatred. The beliefs of our forefathers, or family, or our whole cultural world? Why should we want a society where people have to do that to be accepted without hatred? What about Muslims who convert to Christianity? The Bradford police recorded virulent and terrifying hatred expressed against an ““apostate”” family, repudiated, of course, by mainstream Muslim organisations. But the point is that the police could prosecute only when this hatred erupted into actual criminal damage—the symptom, not the cause. As a member of the Metropolitan Police said to me last week:"““If we allow hatred to go unchallenged we have created circumstances in which violence will flourish but its fomenters will walk away””." Such instances as these are probably not within the experience of noble Lords, nor of the eloquent and cultivated protesters against the Bill. Almost by definition, they occur in uncultivated environments. Personal hatred on grounds of belief is not part of civilised behaviour. It may not happen to Rowan Atkinson and David Pannick QC. It is not at all the same as causing offence. It is frightening hatred against people. It is felt by the woman in the hi’jab, alone, spat on while wheeling the pushchair with her baby in it home from the supermarket. The two splendid maiden speeches by my noble friends Lady Corston and Lord Foulkes, in touch as they have been with constituents, are also important, exactly because of that. But to send a clear signal that the Bill is to protect people, not thought, we must drop the blasphemy law. Even if it cannot be done in this Bill, we need a commitment from my noble friend that it will be undertaken. The blasphemy law undermines the central concept of this Bill, that it is the person who is protected and not the belief.