Fraud Bill [HL]

The definition of property in Clause 5 follows the existing definition of ““property”” in the Theft Act 1968. Under that Act it is established law that the mere taking of information does not give rise to a charge of theft. We would think it highly desirable that the definitions of ““property”” for the purposes of ““theft”” and ““fraud”” should be the same. That is a powerful consideration. I would expect the noble Lord to agree. As the noble Lord rightly says, the question of extending the definition to include ““confidential information”” was raised in consultations on the Bill. In our response we said that we did not think that such a change was ““appropriate or necessary””. I want to explain a little why that would be so, while drawing attention for the record to paragraph 31 of our response. A person who commits a fraud is not interested in obtaining information for its own sake. He obtains credit card details, for example, with a view to financial gain. If his only intention lies in obtaining the information then fraud is not the right charge. Anyone who has in his possession information, such as credit card details, for use in a fraud, having obtained that information in whatever way, would commit an offence under Clause 6. That provides for an offence if a person has in his possession an article,"““for use in the course of or in connection with any fraud””." The process by which he obtained that information—in this example credit card details—might be subject to other charges under Clauses 2 to 4, but only if he has the intent to make an economic gain. Therefore, we do not think that the law of fraud should go so far as the amendment proposes. The Law Commission said, and we agree, that,"““fraud is essentially an economic crime and we do not think that the offence should extend to conduct which has no financial dimension””." So, if there is no intent to make a gain or cause a loss of property, but only of information, then this behaviour needs to prosecuted, if at all, in another context. That of course is not to say that Parliament does not believe that information should in certain specific circumstances be protected. The Computer Misuse Act 1990 would apply if information is obtained by unauthorised access to computers. Certain forms of intellectual property are protected by specific criminal offences: copyright by Section 107 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and trade marks by Section 92 of the Trade Marks Act 1994. In the field of designs and patents, the only relevant offences relate to interference in the procedures for registering. This is a complex area, as the noble Lord will know, and the Government do not think that the offence of fraud should spread out across it in the way that would happen if this amendment were agreed. I hope that that is of some help in explaining our position. I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.