Charities Bill [HL]

I argue that there is already a statutory body which will investigate complaints of maladministration against the Charity Commission, and that is the Parliamentary Ombudsman. In my view, the statutory independent complaints reviewer proposed by this amendment is very similar to the ombudsman. For example, the proposed remit of the ICR is similar to that of the ombudsman. There are three main differences. First, the statutory ICR would be appointed by the Secretary of State whereas the ombudsman is appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Whereas the proposed ICR would report annually to the Secretary of State, the ombudsman must report to Parliament. In this respect, I argue, the ombudsman’s arrangements seem preferable to us, guaranteeing a greater degree of independence and accountability—something which noble Lords have argued for throughout the course of this Bill. Secondly, the proposed statutory ICR would be able to require the commission to apologise to the complainant. The ombudsman has the power to recommend that the commission make an apology where she finds that something has gone wrong. It seems to me that if the commission is required by a complaints investigator to make an apology, the value of the apology is somewhat reduced. The third main difference is that the proposed ICR may make an award of compensation against the commission, whereas the ombudsman can recommend that payment should be made for a financial loss or for the inconvenience or worry that the complainant has been caused. The ombudsman can recommend any level of compensation, if the complainant has evidence to show that he or she has experienced quantifiable financial loss directly as a result of the commission’s maladministration. We should remember here that very few cases reach the ombudsman, and the commission will almost always accept her recommendations. If the commission did not accept a recommendation to pay   compensation, the ombudsman would report the   commission to the Select Committee on Public Administration. The ombudsman’s powers have sufficient teeth in this respect, and we see no need to change the current complaints procedure in statute. In terms of the existing, non-statutory independent complaints reviewer there are a number of advantages in her non-statutory status. Changes are made by agreement and I think that it would be fairly acknowledged that there is a spirit of co-operation between the ICR and the commission. The process of going to the ICR is more informal than the ombudsman’s process and complainants always have recourse to the ombudsman if they are dissatisfied. In summary, therefore, I cannot see any advantages in having a statutory independent complaints reviewer and, indeed, I think that there are a number of disadvantages, to which I have given voice. The present arrangements work well and, for those reasons, we cannot see that this amendment has any additional merit. I think that to have two statutory processes working in a similar way, without the authority that the ombudsman naturally carries, overly complicates the situation. The current informal and, on the other side, formal arrangements work quite well in tandem.