Charities Bill [HL]

My Lords, I believed that this would be a lengthy discussion and I was not disappointed. I have listened very carefully to what my noble friend Lord Wedderburn and supporters of his amendments have said, and to other contributions during the course of the debate. It is important, not least because of that, that I explain as fully as I can the Government’s position and thinking on this point. First, non-religious belief systems which promote moral and spiritual welfare have been for some time, are now, and will continue under the Bill to be charitable. That is secured beyond doubt by subsections 2(l) and 4(a) of Clause 2. It is just worth reminding ourselves of the importance of the Southplace Ethical Society registration. It is more than some 40 years ago—or certainly 20 years—since the British Humanist Association was registered similarly. Since then, a number of other charities promoting humanist, rationalist and ethical and other non-religious belief systems have been registered. Secondly, the Government do not accept that the Bill has any discriminatory effects between charities promoting religious or non-religious belief. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, addressed that issue very well, with his usual forensic understanding of charity law and the intent behind this Bill. Again, this is something that we have looked at very carefully. If there were any discrimination we should have had an obligation under the European Convention on Human Rights to remove it, because the convention does not allow discrimination between religious and non-religious beliefs. In fact, an important effect of this part of the Bill is to level the playing field between religious and non-religious belief, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, said. At the moment, religious organisations enjoy the presumption that they are for the public benefit, while all other organisations promoting non-religious beliefs do not. The Bill simply removes that presumption. This will mean that, after the Bill is enacted, religious beliefs and non-religious beliefs will be in exactly the same position of having to demonstrate public benefit in order to qualify for charitable status. Thirdly, several Members of the Committee, including my noble friends Lord Borrie and Lord   Wedderburn, have pointed to the Equality Bill, in which the Government have specifically mentioned non-religious belief alongside religious belief. It has   been suggested that it is inconsistent of the Government to argue that non-religious belief need not have a specific reference in the Charities Bill while conceding that it needs a specific reference in other legislation. However, there is a good and, we believe, simple reason why a charge of inconsistency will not stick. It is that, without a specific reference in the Equality Bill, non-religious belief would be excluded from the scope of that legislation. In the Charities Bill, non-religious belief is present in the list of charitable purposes by virtue of subsections (2)(l) and (4)(a) of   Clause 2. Those subsections bring in, from the underlying common law, everything which has already been recognised as charitable but which does not come under any of the other headings listed in Clause 2(2). The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, described it as a ““catch-all ragbag””, as if to suggest that it is somehow a second-class method of inclusion. We do not see it that way at all. They are not; and there is no sense in which the law gives belief systems any lesser treatment than any other charitable purpose. The purposes covered by subsection (2)(l) are many and varied. The Charity Commission’s commentary on the description of purposes in the Bill gives 15 examples, including not only moral and spiritual welfare, under   which non-religious beliefs qualify, but also defence of the realm; preservation of public order; relief of unemployment; rehabilitation of ex-offenders; promotion of industry and commerce; promotion of agriculture, and so on. Those are all very important areas of charitable endeavour today. But we cannot give everything that is charitable its own specific heading without making the list ummanageably long. Even if we had a very long list, we would still have to have a final category consisting of purposes which had not been specifically mentioned—to avoid the risk of removing, by default, charitable status from any other recognised purpose which was not mentioned in our long list. No one, to my knowledge, has argued as a matter of principle that we should try to have a comprehensive list so that we did not need that final category. Once you have accepted that we should not go down the comprehensive route, either you must also accept that some existing charitable purposes will have to be placed together under a heading consisting of all the   purposes not specifically mentioned, as the Government have done, or you must accept the risk that some current purposes might, by default, be excluded. The Government do not want to run that risk. Nevertheless I entirely understand the very human tendency to want to see the forms of endeavour which   are closest to your own heart given prominence, even if, as here, they would have only a symbolic prominence and would have no legal or practical effect at all. Fourthly, by including the word ““belief”” in the list   in the terms proposed by my noble friend’s amendment, we would bring in all sorts of beliefs—from, I would argue, the frivolous to the bizarre—that should have no place in charity. I am sure that many of these beliefs are sincerely held, and I do not propose to disparage anyone’s sincerely held belief by naming any of them. I have heard the argument that it is safe to allow all belief systems or philosophies into the list, because those which really had no place in charity would be excluded from it by the public benefit test. If that argument held water, we should be going for a definition of charity that did not have a list of headings of charitable purposes but simply said that anything that was for the public benefit was charitable. The great drawback of that approach is that it produces legislation that gives no clue as to the sorts of endeavour that are charitable purposes. For that reason, it was rejected both by the Strategy Unit in 2002 and by the Government since then. There has not at any stage been an appetite shown for it in any of the consultations that have taken place on the subject; nor has anyone, including the Government, yet been able to formulate a definition of ““belief”” that would achieve what we wanted—by including those that should be included and excluding those that should not. I hope that what I have said has persuaded Members of the Committee that we have thought about the issue seriously. I conclude by repeating that the Bill as currently drafted provides every possible assurance and safeguard that it will remain a charitable purpose to promote moral and spiritual welfare through non-religious belief. I come to the points that were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Swinfen. I have received a letter from Mr   Shah on Jainism. We wrote at least once to Mr   Shah some months ago confirming in terms that Jainism qualifies as a religion under charity law. That holds good under the Bill as now drafted. Clearly, we shall have to respond in similar terms, perhaps with some lengthier explanation, to Mr Shah following his latest correspondence. Of course, I shall share a copy of that response with the noble Lord, Lord Swinfen, and place a copy in the Library of the House. The noble Lord, Lord Swinfen, also raised the question of Animism. As we see it, Animism could qualify as a charity if it is for the moral and spiritual welfare of humankind. Obviously, it needs to pass the public benefit test. No analogy with religion is needed for non-religious beliefs to be charitable, as I carefully explained. That is because they may already be recognised as charitable, and continue to be charitable, under Clause 2(4)(a).